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25 January 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

VIA:

for [REDACTED] Acting Director, PAO

*act saw this memo before
it was put in final form.*

FROM: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED] Study - A Status Report

1. [REDACTED] is presently preparing a revised draft of the NDC study previously shown to you. This new draft will incorporate the data we received from DIA and the Department of Energy. During the later part of 1979, [REDACTED] made repeated requests to NSA for specific answers to queries concerning the upgrading of equipment for intercepting NDC communications. Their queries were never satisfactorily answered which prompted me to send a letter to [REDACTED] of NSA's Executive Support Staff. Copies of that memorandum and the reply from the Chief of G Group, forwarded via [REDACTED] are attached. Even if one overlooks the fact that [REDACTED] letter was addressed to me at the Central Intelligence Agency rather than to the Resource Management Staff, the condescending tone of the reply is extremely irritating. The letter manages to convey the impression that it was drafted "more in sorrow than in anger" and that NSA bemoans the fact that we in RMS, despite the best efforts of NSA, have simply been unable to grasp the lessons they have been trying to teach us. [REDACTED]

2. I was hardly amused by that reply and you can well imagine the reaction of Ellen -- to say nothing of Roxanne -- to such a letter. Having discussed the matter with colleagues in PAO, the PBO CCP Program Monitors, and [REDACTED] I decided to delay any written reply to NSA. Several days ago I was phoned by both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both wished to know if I had received the reply to my query and my reaction to it. I told them that all of us involved in the NDC study were disturbed by both the content and the tone of the reply. Our investigations, as they knew, had led us to the conclusion that the intelligence derived from [REDACTED] traffic was highly valued within the Community; that we were

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25X1 sympathetic to NSA's desire and need to maintain the technical capability to continue to receive and process such intelligence, but that we were dependent upon NSA for answers to specific questions which would enable us to make the appropriate recommendations to you concerning allocations of resources. We were puzzled by the fact that [] had stated that NSA was "managing thus far to maintain its ability to collect and forward the HF NDC of its major targets." Yet we had been told by NSA officials both in Washington and abroad that certain types of NDC traffic previously collected could now no longer be acquired owing to technical difficulties; that traffic which had once been processed speedily now could be handled only with considerable difficulty and with consequent delay in providing a finished product to the customer; and that certain types of communications which would be of value to the Community could not be monitored owing to outmoded equipment. I told Mary that it would be most helpful if these discrepancies could be resolved. Mary stated that she now understood better what we wanted and proposed that Roxanne and I visit NSA early in the week of 28 January for further discussions. In conclusion I told her of your personal interest in this study and our desire to be able to produce a report as complete and as helpful as possible to both the Intelligence Community Staff and NSA. This could only be done if we were given the specific information which we requested. []

3. My conversations with both [] were extremely amicable but I think that neither is in any doubt of our disappointment at having been "stonewalled", albeit in a most gentle fashion. I will advise you upon our return from NSA as to whether we have finally received the information we sought or a suitable explanation as to why it is not forthcoming. Once such information has been received the study can be concluded very rapidly and we will then be able to move on, should you wish, to the ILC problem. []

Attachment:

1. [] dtd 17 Dec
2. [], dtd 7 Jan 80

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Resource Management Staff

17 December 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]
Chief, Executive Support Staff
National Security Agency

FROM:

[redacted]
Program Assessment Office

SUBJECT:

[redacted] Study

Reed

1. You will recall that I mentioned to you several weeks ago the fact that we had not yet received from Mary Hayden answers to some queries concerning the upgrading for equipment of the interception of [redacted]. We are attempting to trace the relationships between proposed equipment upgrades and expected increases in the volume of useful (i.e., production quality) intercepts collected. We would like to be able to make the following kinds of statements for each piece of equipment requested.

2. Obviously, the more precise we can be, the better. But we do realize that some of this information is difficult for you to project. Within these constraints would you please ask G Group to do their best and, where more precision is not possible, indicate the reasons. [redacted]

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